It is not a sign of disrespect to any major thinker if his thought is considered a symptom of wider phenomena that belong to whole social or cultural movements. In the case of Herbert Marcuse, in fact, such a treatment seems especially warranted. The chief interest of Marcuse's thought, accentuated by the writer's depth, erudition, and sophistication as a philosophical synthesizer, is that it exhibits in a curious and dramatic way the strains and stresses characterizing "New Left" radical thought as a whole in advanced industrial society. 
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and protracted process, starting with attacks on churches as institutions (Voltaire), continuing with assaults on the doctrine of spirit and transcendence (Holbach and the materialists), and culminating in the denial of the man-nature distinction (Feuerbach and the Left Hegelians). On the one hand, the modern radical has been firm in his acceptance of the assumptions on which the modern notion of politics rests: assumptions relating to the sovereignty of the community and the self-sufficiency of the individual human being. On the other hand, however, he has been sensitive to needs not attended to in a secular culture: needs relating to the knowledge of ultimate values and the belonging to a reality higher than the individual. When the radical takes upon himself the task of providing for religious needs, however, he cannot very easily avoid becoming tangled up with some of the features of religion. Hence the two strains in radicalism: the cause of unity can be furthered either by emphasizing the assumptions rooted in the notion of modern secular "politics," or by relying upon ideas and attitudes derived from our religious tradition. The important point to notice, of course, is that right up to the present the "political" tradition of radicalism has almost completely dominated the field, while the "religious" tradition has been muted. The prime example is Marx whose thought moved from the quasi-religion of Left Hegelianism to "Marxism," which is thoroughly political.
To elucidate the distinctions between the two strains, we can consider them under three headings that correspond to the three cardinal concerns of radicalism. The first relates to the radical's criticism of society. The political tradition begins with the "people." A certain kind of ground-level "democratism" (not necessarily a belief in "democracy") is, indeed, an integral aspect of the modern notion of politics. Politics, and a fortiori radical politics, conceives of values, power, and legitimacy as proceeding in an "ascending" order from the governed, the people, to government and institutions in general.2 Thus the political radical has always presented his case as an articulation of the people's ultimate desires and wishes. His concern has been with human relations, and his 
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complaints have accordingly been couched in terms that refer to these relations: oppression, exploitation, enslavement. Political radicals have seen the raison d'etre of their oppositional platforms in the unhappiness of other human beings, and in their visible and conscious suffering under the yoke of an unjust, inhuman, or decadent political and social system. Radicals would, of course, admit that in certain circumstances the oppressed may endure their situation, but they would nevertheless maintain that the radical programs they advocate are both in the interest of and in accordance with the wishes of the people. Religious radicalism, on the other hand, begins not with the people, or the putative (and possibly inarticulate) wishes of the people, but from an idealized norm of what human nature and society should become. Radical politics has assumed man to be good and rational, though sometimes misguided. For religious radicalism man appears reprobate, though, of course, capable of being saved. The religious radical has thus been concerned not so much with oppression, suffering, and unhappiness, as with sin, corruption, and degradation-the quality of a certain way of life. He, too, would abhor oppression, but he would often be more interested in the salvation of the perpetrator of injustice than with relieving the immediate suffering of the victim. Admittedly, the two positions are not very far removed from each other, and can sometimes overlap. Below, however, in my discussion of Marcuse's critique of advanced industrial society, I shall take the opportunity of further commenting on the differences between them.
The second point relates to the radical's understanding of the society he criticizes. Here again we can distinguish between two widely diverging tendencies, one typically political and the other typically religious, though here, too, overlaps and mutual interpenetration are not entirely absent. The political way of understanding society is to analyze it, to strive to comprehend it in terms of its own characteristics, life, and features, its own constituent parts. Radical thought in the political style has likewise tended to concentrate on objectionable features within society itself, leading to the discovery of "conflicts" between society's constituent parts. Thus we have had theories of the baleful character of aristocratic and monarchical government, later replaced by theories of class conflict (and also conflicts of nations or races). The religious way of understanding society, in contrast, is not by analysis but by designation or holistic pronouncement. The religious radical attributes objectionable features in society not to any conflict of interest between classes or races, but to something, some non-human agency, that afflicts society and human nature as a whole. Erstwhile theological and quasi-theological formulations of this agency included the "devil," "original sin," "evil spirit," and the like, but more recent versions, such as "nature," "ignorance," "alienation," and "instinct," belong to the same category, as long as-the crucial point-they do not lead to a dichotomization of society, but leave society, for the purposes of radical reform or revolution, as one undifferentiated whole. "Man," it has been said,3 is an apolitical term. It is very important to grasp this last point, for in the political tradition of radicalism it has not been unheard of to argue in terms of "conflicts of interest" that are at the same time attributed to some non-social or non-human factor. Thus in Rousseau inequality is connected with vanity, in Bentham sinister interest with ignorance, and in Marx exploitation with alienation. But the point is that with these and other radical thinkers of the modern age designation leads unilaterally to analysis, and it is then that the analytical part of the thinker's theory will be seen as relevant to the radicars struggle to change society. The religious understanding, it seems, is chiefly characterized by a fixation on, or tendency towards, simple holistic designation, i.e., pronouncing society and man to be suffering from a ubiquitous "imperfection" or some mysterious "illness." The consequences of this divergence are obvious. The political radical, since his immediate attention is on conflict, has tended to attribute primary importance to active political fight, involving institutional change. The religious radical, since he is preoccupied with a universal affliction, has tended on the other hand to be con- This leads us to the third point which relates to the radical's program in his endeavor to change man and society. Political radicalism, almost by definition, has been traditionally understood to mean efforts to change the institutions and the pattern of the distribution of power in society. Prior change in individuals has not, as a rule, been considered important, partly because of the democratic assumption (see above), and partly because it has been held that the existing structure of society actually prevents the development of radical consciousness. Religious change, on the other hand, has meant the primary (and sometimes exclusive) change of people's hearts and minds. Both strains of radicalism do, of course, stress the importance of "education" prior to change, but with one all-important difference. Political education tells the people why they are unhappy and how they can improve their situation, whereas religious education tells the people why they should no longer feel happy (i.e., that they are sinful) and how they can improve themselves (leading, in some instances, to an improvement of their situation). Forcible education in a new society (as long as it is regarded as "temporary") is compatible with politics, while religious education in radicalism does not have to envisage a permanent state of "unhappiness" in the future. Religious radicalism, while insisting on individual "conversion," may or may not involve intentions to change society as well. For many varieties of religious extremism institutional change has appeared not merely secondary but unimportant: it has been held that a new spirit can infuse and regenerate even corrupt institutions, or alternatively that converts to a new way of life can rise above the external institutional world. Finally, in the case of political radicalism we can usually find a more or less conscious distinction between the activity to change and changed activity. The political radical, acting on his assumptions of conflict and the necessity to fight, has tended to accept the "compromise" solution of struggling against a form of society with weapons suited to the nature of that society, and not to the society he wants eventually to achieve. Religious radicalism, since it insists on "total" change, with the emphasis on the individual human being, has tended on the other hand to conflate means and ends, and hence to evaluate radical action in terms of its ideal, rather than in terms of the society it considers ought to be changed.
We have, then, the three antitheses between the political and religious strains: dissatisfaction versus sinfulness; conflict versus universal malady; and structural change versus individual conversion. We may now proceed with our examination of Marcuse.
MARCUSE's CRITIQUE OF ADVANCED SOCIETY
To start with the Marcusean critique. Marcuse, of course, is a Marxist, and Marxism belongs to the political tradition. The overall framework of his criticism, therefore, is still primarily couched in terms of the effects of advanced society on those, within and without, who are not part of it. He calls attention to the openly oppressive, violent features of this society, often mentioning such defects as poverty, neo-colonialism, imperialist wars, and racial discrimination. But while he is not blind to evils that the political radical has been wont to notice, it is not an exaggeration to say that the central parts of his critique display a vastly different emphasis and concentration. Marcuse, we could say, has become Marcuse not because he restated Marxism in more moral and philosophical terms, but because he endeavored to redirect traditional radical criticism from the suffering underdog to the corrupt, degraded, misled agent of oppression and injustice. The tone of Marcuse's critique is the tone of a Saint Paul and Savonarola, only faintly resembling the customary idiom of modern political radicals. He is the scourge of a society that "degrades everything" and acts "in an increasingly inhuman way,"4 in which there is a "complete degradation of man to an object," the "progressive brutalism and moronization of man."5
He fights "against the system's hypocritical morality,"6 being concerned with "a moral rebellion, against the blasphemous religion of this society."7 In Marcuse's opinion "the revolt at home against "potential freedom" of people, threats to which can go unnoticed, as the minds of people are "manipulated."12 Professor Bay, therefore, would like to see the individual able to resist these threats, "insofar as the manipulation serves other interests at the expense of his own."'13 Elsewhere, Bay proposes to found politics "on the study of basic human needs as distinct from manifest wants and demands," adding that manifest demands are often the outcome of indoctrination.14 Now perhaps we can make our distinction more exact and intelligible. The crucial ideas are "indoctrination" and "other interests." Bay and Lenin (and others of similar persuasion) remain within the traditional idiom of political radicalism insofar as they base their respective conceptions of "manipulation" and "indoctrination" upon a notion of some conflict of interest, and insofar as their dichotomies between "real" and "false" consciousness still identify "real" with "the individual's own" and "false" with something merely "external." Marcuse, however, often seems to sever even this tenuous link with the political tradition of radicalism. The concept of the "people's real will" can be stretched to quite a degree, but then it snaps and what we are left with is the higher (religious) norm prescribing how people ought to live their lives. Marcuse's central notion of "one-dimensionality," for example, goes considerably further than even the neo-Marxist concept of "alienation." While "alienation" still posits a gap between the individual self and society, the Marcusean critique sees the individual as wholly absorbed in and by his world. The actual desires and wishes of "one-dimensional man," therefore, are acknowledged to be genuine and natural, though Marcuse regards them as morally objectionable. His critique, as one commentator has put it, contains "infinite plasticity," and it "regresses into theology" inasmuch as Marcuse cannot falsify the false consciousness through "real contradictions within the existing. Marcuse asserts that in advanced society there is "a one-dimensional static identification of the individual with the others and with the administered reality principle."16 "This identification is not illusion but reality . . . the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence. There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in all forms."" The subjective need to change is repressed "firstly, by virtue of the actual satisfaction of needs, and secondly, by a massive scientific manipulation and administration of needs.'8 The present needs and satisfactions, Marcuse goes on, "to a great extent, have become the individual's own."'9 Advanced society has achieved this unprecedented degree of "onedimensional" conformity "not by terror but by the more or less beneficial productivity and efficiency of the apparatus."20 There is now "voluntary compliance" and "pre-established harmony between individual needs and socially required desires, goals, and aspirations."21 Paradoxically perhaps, Marcuse's critique, seen in the light of more traditionally conceived political criticisms, depicts advanced society as almost a veritable paradise, where people do not simply endure a system, do not have to conceal or struggle against their feelings of unhappiness, but are unreservedly happy and contented. Advanced society "delivers the goods." "It is a good way of life-much better than before-and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change."22 Individuals here can enjoy the "freedom from using the brain,"23 and they are, in their "repressed" state, still "reasonably and often even exuberantly happy."'4 Statements of a similar kind could be cited from Mar- cuse's writings almost ad infinitum, but these seem adequate to show the essential character of his critique of advanced society. The character of this critique is religious. Marcuse's attention is fixed on quality, moral value, a way of life, and his demons are perversion, degradation, corruption, and a shameful form of happiness and contentment. Marcuse, the radical thinker, claims no longer only to articulate the people's wishes and to contrapose them to the wishes of an outside oppressor or exploiter, he claims no longer simply to represent the people's interest as against the interest of some other group. His dichotomy of human needs is between two kinds, both of which are real, but one of which is higher and the other lower. Instead of asserting that he represents a "general will," he openly declares that his aim is "to transform the will itself, so that people no longer want what they now want."25 Perhaps it should be emphasized here that Marcuse's arguments appear to a large extent valid, testifying to the courage, independence, and perspicuity of their author. But it is important to realize that Marcuse's arguments and accusations land him in a "dimension" different from the political tradition of radical criticism.
MARCUSE'S EXPLANATION
But let us proceed further. As we have seen, Marcuse's critique of advanced society, though containing (and emphasizing) motifs that can only be called religious, is nonetheless ostensibly derived from a framework that is still Marxist and still pronouncedly political. Now Marcuse often writes as though he would explain the phenomenon of "one-dimensionality" as well as the bureaucratic arrest in socialist states26 by reference to the "vicious circle" of peaceful coexistence, and all his writings are liberally sprinkled with statements arguing that advanced society in the West still has a capitalist, i.e., antagonistic, class character, that "'exploitation" is still going on, and that basic social conflicts, which give rise to the "moronization" of advanced society, are still ulti-70 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 34, 1972 mately derivable from contradictions in the productive process. There is no need to doubt that Marcuse's belief in the truth and explanatory power of these orthodox Marxian categories is genuine. The interesting question for us, however, is to see to what extent Marcuse as a theorist can accommodate these and other Marxian categories of explanation with other, equally if not more genuinely held, elements in his thought. Does the logic of his understanding of man and society render these Marxian categories necessary to the fabric of his thought, or does it reveal them as superfluous? On this reading of Marcuse the answer seems to be the latter; indeed, these other elements in the Marcusean understanding again seem to place Marcuse perilously near to typically religious moulds of explanation.
Marcuse tends consistently to obscure the identity of antagonistic forces in society, especially the adversary whom more orthodox radicals would designate as some kind of "ruling class." It is Marcuse's main thesis that in advanced society class rule is replaced by (and not merely disguised as) the rule of things. This society "alters the base of domination by gradually replacing personal dependence . . . with dependence on the 'objective order of thifigs'. . . *"27 "Society is indeed the whole which exercises its independent power over the individuals, and this Society is no unidentifiable 'ghost'. It has its empirical hard core in the system of institutions. . . .28 Again: "what actually dominates is the economic, political and cultural apparatus, which has become an indivisible unity constructed by social labour."29 A random selection of terms used by Marcuse to denote the adversary would be interesting here: system of anonymous powers, system of subdued pluralism, the powers that be, total administration, anonymous power of technological society, They, the Masters, the Establishment, unmastered forces in society, introjected social controls, etc., etc. Not only are these terms lacking in definite political content,30 while rich in evocative, quasireligious flavor, but they suggest, sometimes openly but more 270ne Dimensional Man, 120. It may be remarked at this point, however, that Marcuse's preference for "repression" and "domination" over "exploitation" renders his theory more convincing and more homogeneous than some other Freud-inspired neo-Marxian attempts that are beset by the same kinds of problems. It is no doubt possible to condemn, with Marx and other political radicals, the "oppression" that obtains in certain societies. It is also possible to talk about the "repression of instincts" in the Freudian idiom. It is also possible (though not easy) to establish a theoretical connection between the two. What is not possible is to maintain innocently that political oppression and instinctual repression are identical or even continuous in meaning.34
The concept of "domination," his version of the perennial religious notion of evil, is defined by Marcuse in a characteristically broad manner. He writes in his latest book: "Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them, are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed. Domination can be exercized by men, by nature, by things-it can also be internal, exercized by the individual himself.." 35 He adds that in this last case domination would appear as "autonomy." Of particular importance here is not Marcuse's apparent indifference to the distinctions between external and internal domination, his implied view that both these forms are just sub-species, manifestations of a deeper-lying, almost generic phenomenon in human life. What we have to notice is that Marcuse's indifference is only apparent, and that, as his arguments unfold, he comes to intimate rather strongly that in his hierarchy of evil "internal domination" (which parades as "autonomy") is the more objectionable of the two. In a revealing passage he talks about the price that previous generations have had to pay for political freedom (calling to mind, incidentally, Political freedom is developed on this double basis of moral compulsion: wrung from absolutism in bloody street conflicts and battles, it is set up, secured and neutralized in the self-discipline and selfrenunciation of individuals. They have leamed that their inalienable freedom is subject to duties not the least of which is the suppression of instinctual drives. Moral and physical compulsion have a common denominator-domination.36
Now this is an extreme position for Marcuse to take, and it is in sharp contrast to some of our cherished beliefs about the necessary price we have to pay for political freedom. This price has always (and rightly) been understood to involve the need for vigilance, both in the form of institutional militancy (e.g., the "safeguarding of democracy"), and in the shape of the internalization of certain basic moral rules. In the best case these rules do indeed appear "autonomous," "prescribed by the individual himself." Marcuse, however, seems to assert that "self-discipline" itself is pernicious, being just another form of "domination," and he goes even so far as to say that self-discipline "neutralizes" political achievements. Marcuse's strictures against "Kantian" morality suggest that at least in some of his moods he prefers a future society where "spontaneity" and "free instinctual gratification" are the main goods, leaving the question of political rule and political freedom conveniently obscured, to one where "self-renunciation" is consciously and deliberately accepted with a view to preserving political freedom. If, as seems likely, these two alternatives are empirically incompatible, it is not difficult to see which is the more "politically" radical of the two. and logical coherence of the story,41 and acclaims only its "symbolic value." But since Marcuse is emphatic in his scathing criticism of science and conventional logic, the disclaimer should perhaps not be taken too seriously. Marcuse's pejorative view of "common sense" is well known from the pages of One Dimensional Man, thus his opinion that while the Freudian myth defies common sense it claims "a truth which common sense has been trained to forget,"42 can be construed as a clear acceptance of the myth. Now the Freudian myth explains the origin of instinctual repression and ensuing "domination" strictly by reference to the nature of human instincts, in particular to the libidinal drive to obtain maximum sexual gratification. In the primal horde, ex hypothesi, the father kept all the women to himself, whereupon the other males, the sons, one day revolted and succeeded in killing him, taking the women and now obtaining the sexual pleasure hitherto denied them.43 Marcuse, however, attempts in a rather confused way to supplement and reinterpret the myth by introducing a wholly extraneous category, "scarcity." His purpose is to show that the repression of instincts is an historical phenomenon, and not a human biological necessity. The point assumes crucial importance in an evaluation of Marcuse's optimistic predictions regarding the present possibility of ending "domination" in society. Marcuse has some very interesting and seemingly plausible theses on the potentially "liberating" effects of advanced technology, on the reduction of labor time and the increase of free time, on the possibility of mankind's leaving behind the phase of the "struggle for existence" and embarking on the "pacification of existence"-all of which, however, (and alas) rest on a feeble foundation. All these arguments assume as their major first premise that the disappearance of natural scarcity has something important to do with repression and domination. But if, as seems to be the case, Marcuse is unable to demonstrate that these two phenomena are linked by more than historically contingent factors in the development of both instinct and technology, his optimistic belief in the immediate practicality of a "non-repressive civilization" rings somewhat hollow. Moreover, at times Marcuse seems to contradict even his own views on the end of scarcity, admitting for example that "the conquest of scarcity is still confined to small areas of advanced industrial society."45 And in his latest book we read: " . . . neither nature nor poverty nor weakness compels the first suppression of instincts, which is the most important one for the evolution of culture, but rather the despotism of domi- The "despotism of domination" thus finally appears as its own cause and mainstay. On the whole, therefore, Marcuse's endeavor to unite the "outer" and the "inner," the concerns of political and religious radicalism, falls to the ground here in his attempted explanation of the roots of all evil in human life and society. These roots for him remain obstinately in an inner world and have only marginal relevance to politics.
We may briefly consider another issue under this heading. While Marcuse underplays the importance of conflict in society and is consequently ambiguous on the question of the adversary, tending towards the view that there is no human adversary at all, he appears much more forceful and markedly more "political" on the question of the protagonist, his "home team," as it were.47 Who, what social group, is destined to bring about the revolutionary changes Marcuse desires? Searching for the "historical subject" of the revolution is one of the most persistently recurring themes in his writings, and Marcuse's Marxist conscience is evidently disturbed by his difficulties in finding it. Marcuse's fame, again, rests on his courageous break with Marxian orthodoxy, in that he asserts that the classical Marxian working class in advanced industrial society has ceased to be revolutionary in its needs and aspirations.48 Marcuse toys with the various solutions, resorting sometimes to philosophy, sometimes to the nations of the developing third world. Most important in this context, however, is his advocacy of sundry new groups thrown up by advanced industrial society itself, an advocacy that has led to his much-criticized "elitism." 
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To make just two points in this connection. First, Marcuse is well aware that in original Marxism the vaunted position of the working class rested on both "objective" and "subjective" considerations, i.e., the working class was assumed by Marx to be both able and willing to bring about the revolution: able because it was the basic productive class, and willing because it was excluded from the dubious blessings of early capitalist culture and prosperity. Marcuse's problem is that today these two desiderata are disunited, concretized in different groups,49 and Marcuse's aim is to effect a new synthesis. It is suggested here, however, that Marcuse's approach to this question indicates not merely a radical reversion of the erstwhile Marxian position, but also its attempted transfer (or retransfer?) from a political idiom into a religious one. Marcuse seems to assume that revolutionary "ability" and revolutionary "need" are related only externally, that hence almost any pre-existing subjective "need" can be simply transformed into a revolutionary force once a suitable "vehicle" is found for it. But in Marx (even, to some extent, in the early Marx) these two aspects are internally related: the working class is not just excluded from capitalist society; it is excluded because it is the basic productive class. And the "subjective need" of the working class to revolt and overthrow capitalist society becomes important only because it is the genuine, irresistibly erupting need of the basic productive class. As Robinson remarks, when Marcuse turned to Freud, he "did not lose faith in the correctness or the relevance of Marxian theory, but the historical failure of the forces to which Marx had entrusted the revolution convinced him that European society had reached a stage where even more radical critical concepts were needed."50 But the jettisoning of the "historical forces" takes the linchpin out of the Marxian system. In Marx the dialectic has an unmistakably political character: for him it is the will and the needs of the immense majority (the "people") that set the wheels of history in motion (leaving the currently fashionable structuralist interpretation alone for now). In Marcuse, in contrast, the dialectic issues out of a disembodied 49Herbert Marcuse, "Revolutionary Subject and Self-government," Praxis, Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2 (1969), 326-329. 50Robinson, The Freudian Left, 179.
will, and for him the motive force of historical change is provided by human needs that are acknowledged to be merely idealized projections. It would be quite unfair, however, to assert that Marcuse on this score has nothing politically interesting to offer. The important point about his "elitism," which it appears has not yet been sufflciently emphasized,5t is that it contains two different kinds of elitist conceptions; these are logically independent of each other, with one again revealing a political, the other a religious strain in his thought. Marcuse, as we have noted above, puts his faith in various new groups generated in advanced society itself. He is careful not to call them "classes" in the Marxian sense, but he regards them as the "detonator" or the "catalyst" of the revolution, serving an essentially preparatory function.
Here we have to ask the question: what makes any of these groups eligible to be the "catalyst?" Why should we believe that they, or anybody else, can and will lead us to a new world? Marcuse's thinking here again reveals a curious duality, an uneasy fluctuation between hardheaded political realism and conceptions of a very different kind. First, in the traditional idiom of elitist radical politics, Marcuse talks about the emergence of a "new working class." He emphatically denies that students today form a "declasse group." "The role of students today as the intelligentsia out of which, as you know, the executives and leaders even of existing society are recruited, is historically more important than it perhaps was in the past."52 Again: "it is the group from which the decisive holders of decisive positions will be recruited: scientists, researchers, technicians, engineers, even psychologists....
Marcuse explains why he thinks intellectuals are so important today: " . . . to the degree to which the share of labor in the material process of production declines, inttellectual skills and capabilities become social and political factors. Today, the organized refusal to co-operate of the scientists, mathematicians, technicians, industrial psychologists, and Now there are several points here that should receive critical comment. It is essential to realize that this conception of Marcuse is squarely and wholly in the tradition of modem political theory. It shows clear resemblance not only to Mill's intellectual elitism and Lenin's conception of the revolutionary vanguard-these antecedents Marcuse would no doubt be ready to acknowledge as his intellectual predecessors-but also to conceptions deriving from the elitist tradition of sociological theory. Though at times Marcuse is at pains to assert that the "new working class" is an extension of the classical Marxian proletariat,55 he is not able, in theoretical terms, to establish a connection between his ideas and traditional Marxism.
Is Marcuse's belief in the "new working class" a realistic one? We cannot, of course, go into a sociological analysis here, but we can focus attention on some of the assumptions that go into Marcuse's claim. The first assumption is that scientists, technicians, etc. are actually in such a strong, commanding position in today's advanced society that they can reasonably be expected to be able, objectively, to engineer or detonate revolutionary changes. Attractive and plausible though this assumption may appear at first, there does not seem to be much solid evidence behind it. Do scientists really control their inventions, are technicians really the masters of the technology they created? Would the intellectuals' refusal to cooperate with the system really make that great a difference? Has it done so up to date in, say, the United States? The claim is doubtful, to say the least. Second, Marcuse assumes that this new political elite composed of scientists, technicians, and intellectuals will in fact develop the need and will to revolt against the way of life of advanced society. So far there is very little evidence that this is happening, and inasmuch as it makes sense to talk about the revolutionary stirrings of the intelligentsia, it has been confined strictly to non-technical groups, such as writers, philoso- phers, artists, and clergymen. The behavior and aspirations of students, even in the case of "recruits" to the technical professions, characterize them only as students and are in no way indicative of the needs and outlooks they are likely to acquire when they reach established positions. What is more important here, however, is that Marcuse's expectation of a revolt detonated by future scientists clearly contradicts his own characterization of the essential nature of advanced society. Marcuse is reluctant to talk clearly about a "ruling class," but inasmuch as his theory can be said to make implicit references to one, it is precisely the group comprising "technicians, industrial psychologists and public opinion pollsters." If anybody benefits from the "moronization" of the masses, they certainly do; if advanced society in its present form serves anybody's interest, it certainly serves the interest of this group.
Finally, how is Marcuse's conception of a strong, new political elite capable of inaugurating the society of the future to be squared with another characteristic conception of his, namely, his celebrated espousal of Lumpenproletariat groups? What about the "outsiders and the poor, the unemployed and unemployable, the persecuted colored races, the inmates of prisons and mental institutions";5" "the new boheme, the beatniks and hipsters, the peace creeps" who are the "'poor refuge of defamed humanity";57 the individual who "becomes authentic as outcast, drug addict, sick, genius?"58 It is Marcuse's opinion that the "strongest impetus" to revolution comes from groups of this kind, and he insists that in the absence of a strong revolutionary party the so-called "infantile radicals" are "the weak and confused but true historical heirs of the great socialist tradition."59 This may be true, as far as it goes. But there is an enormous, yawning gap between these "decadents" and the future "decisive holders of decisive positions." Can these two groups be expected to have any contact with each other, or even to understand and sympathize with each other's point of view? The very essence of a self-conscious Lumpenproletariat is its implacable opposition not only to holders of decisive positions but to the "decisive positions" themselves. And conversely it is also true (and has been borne out by recen't political changes in both the United States and England) that the strengthening and articulation of the genuine outcast's opposition to the way of life of advanced society tend to confirm, rather than weaken, the conservative inclinations of mainstream groups, such as technicians. The few adherents gained by the outsiders' underground fraternity are more than matched by the number of those frightened away. Quite apart from the complications of a new working class, Marcuse's beliefs about the outcast present some problems of their own. Insofar as Marcuse imputes any capability to these groups of preparing or detonating any kind of revolution, this "preparation" and this "revolution" are very different in character from what genuine political elites can achieve. Outcasts, "pariah elites,"60 cannot bring about political changes. What they can do, and what the "scum of the earth" have accomplished before them, is to prepare for a radical change in the heart and the mind, to influence and convert by example, to shock a "one-dimensional" populace into spiritual regeneration and the mending of their ways. While one would not wish to denigrate such purposes and achievements, it is better to see them for what they are and to distinguish them from more mundane and limited concerns.
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM
This takes us to the third level of our inquiry, and it is here, in relation to practical programs and advice given to radicals, that the duality and ambiguity of Marcuse's thought sharpen into contradictory positions. On the one hand, Marcuse maintains that "inner" transformation by itself is meaningless and inadequate. He offers, for example, a Marxist-type explanation for the efficacy of the antiVietnam protest movement of American youth, calling attention to 60Reiche describes the activities of some groups formed in West Germany in the 1960s, inspired by Marcuse's ideas: ". . Subversive Action is made up of ringleaders of organized disobedience. As a first step towards the emancipated society of the cohort, they declare themselves a pariah elite whose direct purpose is action." Sexuality and Class Struggle, 147. its possibly crippling effects on a capitalist war economy. Also, though he insists that authentic socialism means more than a changeover in the ownership of the means of production, he nevertheless regards collectivization as a necessary first step towards creating the desired new society.61 He argues, furthermore, that "organization demands counter-organization,"62 and he calls for positive political action, advocating "uncivil disobedience" and "guerilla warfare."63 His sensational and provocative essay on Repressive Tolerance contains not only valuable insights for fresh departures in a radical contemporary critique of political theory,64 but, on a practical level, it dispenses political advice of, it must be admitted, a decidedly extremist character.
Marcuse's radical program, however, has another side to it. The very nature of his critique of advanced society as well as his understanding of domination prevent Marcuse's activist program from becoming clear-cut, single-minded, and unambiguous. In the first place, Marcuse is compelled to admit that a "revolution" in advanced society is not an immediate, practical possibility. The primary task, therefore, is to awaken the "brutalized, moronized mass," to engineer, in other words, a large-scale inner transformation. Second, Marcuse must also argue, in terms of his own explanation of the root evil in human life, that external, political, and social revolution is at best only a part of the solution, and that transformation must be deeper and more far-reaching. Domination he sees as "the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure."65 He observes that revolutionary transformations in the past have betrayed the cause of "liberation," because radicals have stopped short of changing their own needs and outlook on life, which were fashioned under the reign of instinctual repression. To prevent, therefore, yet another "psychic Thermidor,"66 Marcuse insists on the 65An Essay on Liberation, 11. 66Five Lectures, 38.
